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Thanks to new DNA technologies and the heroic efforts of 
innocence advocates, there is increasing public recognition that 
our criminal justice system often convicts the wrong people. 
Criminal informants, or "snitches,"l play a prominent role in 
this wrongful conviction phenomenon. According to 
Northwestern University Law School's Center on Wrongful 
Convictions, 45.9 percent of documented wrongful capital 
convictions have been traced to false informant testimony, 
making "snitches the leading cause of wrongful convictions in 
U.S. capital cases."2 Horror stories abound of lying jailhouse 
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This piece is based in 
part on my earlier article, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2004), which offers a global analysis of the role of snitches in 
the criminal system and their impact on high crime communities. 
1 By "snitches" I mean criminals who provide information in exchange for 
lenience for their own crimes or other benefits. The term "informant" therefore does 
not include law· abiding citizens who provide information to the police with no benefit 
to themselves. 
2 Rob Warden, The Snitch System: How Snitch Testimony Sent Randy Steidl 
and Other Innocent Americans to Death Row, Center on Wrongful Convictions, 
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snitches and paid informants who frame innocent people in 
pursuit of cash or lenience for their own crimes.3 In recognition 
of the dangers of informants who lie, capital reform proposals 
often contain provisions designed to restrain the use of 
informant testimony.4 
But informants do not generate wrongful convictions 
merely because they lie. Mter all, lying hardly distinguishes 
informants from other sorts of witnesses. Rather, it is how and 
why they lie, and how the government depends on lying 
informants, that makes snitching a troubling distortion of the 
truth-seeking process. Informants lie primarily in exchange for 
lenience for their own crimes, although sometimes they lie for 
money.5 In order to obtain the benefit of these lies, informants 
must persuade the government that their lies are true. Police 
and prosecutors, in turn, often do not and cannot check these 
lies because the snitch's information may be all the government 
has. Additionally, police and prosecutors are heavily invested 
in using informants to conduct investigations and to make 
their cases.6 As a result, they often lack the objectivity and the 
information that would permit them to discern when 
informants are lying.7 This gives rise to a disturbing marriage 
of convenience: both snitches and the government benefit from 
inculpatory information while neither has a strong incentive to 
challenge it.8 The usual protections against false evidence, 
particularly prosecutorial ethics and discovery, may thus be 
unavailing to protect the system from informant falsehoods 
precisely because prosecutors themselves have limited means 
and incentives to ferret out the truth.9 
This Comment briefly surveys in Part I some of the data on 
3 See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text. 
4 See, e.g. ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 120-22 
(Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter ILLINOIS COMMISSION] (recommending enhanced 
documentation and discovery regarding the government's use of informants); see also 
ILL. COMPo STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21 (2003) (adopting Commission recommendation 
requiring reliability hearings for jailhouse informants). 
5 Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal 
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 652 (2004). 
6Id. at 671. 
7 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth 
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 945 (1999). 
8 This scenario presupposes some good faith on the part of the government; the 
purposeful use of false evidence is of course more problematic. 
9 Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 947. 
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snitch-generated wrongful convictions. lO In Part II, it describes 
in more detail the institutional relationships among snitches, 
police, and prosecutors that make snitch falsehoods so 
pervasive and difficult to discern using the traditional tools of 
the adversarial process. l1 Part III concludes with a litigation 
suggestion for a judicial check on the use of informant 
witnesses, namely, a Daubert-style12 pre-trial reliability 
hearing.l3 The Appendix in Part IV contains a sample motion 
requesting and justifying such a hearing. 14 
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTION DATA 
In 2000, the groundbreaking book Actual Innocence 
estimated that twenty-one percent of wrongful capital 
convictions are influenced by snitch testimony.15 Four years 
later, a study by the Center on Wrongful Convictions doubled 
that number.16 Another recent report estimates that twenty 
percent of all California wrongful convictions, capital or 
otherwise, result from false snitch testimony.17 The Illinois 
Commission on Capital Punishment, in reviewing that state's 
wrongfully convicted capital defendants, identified "a number 
of cases where it appeared that the prosecution relied unduly 
on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness with something 
to gain. In some cases, this was an accomplice, while in other 
cases it was an in-custody informant."18 Professor Samuel 
Gross's study on exonerations likewise reports that nearly fifty 
percent of wrongful murder convictions involved perjury by 
someone such as a "jailhouse snitch or another witness who 
stood to gain from the false testimony."19 
10 See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text. 
12 Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring courts to 
independently evaluate the reliability of expert testimony). 
13 See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text. 
15 JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 156 
(Doubleday 2000). 
16 Warden, supra note 2, at 3. 
17 Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, SAN FRANCISCO MAGAZINE 87-88 (Nov. 2004) 
(estimating the number of California wrongful convictions as being in the hundreds or 
even thousands). 
18 ILLINOIS COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 8. 
19 Samuel R. Gross et aI., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 
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Behind these general statistics lie numerous stories of 
informant crime, deceit, secret deals and government 
duplicity. 20 In Texas, in the so-called "sheetrock scandal," a 
group of police officers and informants set up dozens of 
individuals with fake drugs, which were actually gypsum, the 
main, non-narcotic component of sheetrock.21 The suspects 
were typically Mexican workers, and many pleaded guilty or 
were deported before the scandal was uncovered.22 In Los 
Angeles, DEA informant Essam Magid not only avoided jail for 
his many crimes but earned hundreds of thousands of dollars 
by serving as an informant.23 During this time, he framed 
dozens of innocent people before one person he targeted finally 
refused to plead guilty and revealed the arrangement. 24 The 
now-infamous Leslie White, the prototypical jailhouse snitch, 
sent dozens of suspects to prison by fabricating confessions and 
evidence, reducing his own sentences by years. 25 
Although such horror stories provoke outcry, little has 
been done to cabin the law enforcement discretion that makes 
such informant operations possible, or to· impose greater 
transparency and oversight onto the process in order to curtail 
such abuses. 
II. INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED: LAw ENFORCEMENT 
DEPENDENCE ON SNITCHES 
Informants have become law enforcement's investigative 
tool of choice, particularly in the ever-expanding world of drug 
enforcement.26 Informants are part of a thriving market for 
information.27 In this market, snitches trade information with 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543-44 (2005). 
20 Natapoff, supra note 5, at 656-57. 
21 Fake Drugs, real lives: Evolution of a Scandal, DALLAsNEWS.COM, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.comls/dws/spe/2003/fakedrugs/fakedrugll 03.html (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2006). 
22 ld.; see also Ross Milloy, Fake Drugs Force an End to 24 Cases in Dallas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at AI. 
23 John Glionna and Lee Romney, Snagging a Rogue Snitch, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
2005, at Al (chronicling DEA's reliance on Magid). 
24 ld. 
25 ROBERT BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 64-66 (praeger 2000). 
26 Natapoff, supra note 5, at 655. 
27 See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563 
(1999). 
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police and prosecutors in exchange for lenience, the dismissal 
of charges, reduced sentences, or even the avoidance of arrest.28 
It is a highly informal, robust market that is rarely scrutinized 
by courts or the public.29 And it is growing.30 While data is 
hard to come by, federal statistics indicate that sixty percent of 
drug defendants cooperate in some fashion. 31 Informants 
permeate all aspects of law enforcement, from investigations to 
plea -bargaining to trial. 32 
The growth in the sheer number of informants reflects the 
increasing dependence of police and prosecutors on 
informants. 33 Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky describes 
prosecutors' own complaints: "These [drug] cases are not very 
well investigated. . .. [O]ur cases are developed through 
cooperators and their recitation of the facts. Often, in DEA, 
you have agents who do little or no follow up so when a 
cooperator comes and begins to give you information outside of 
the particular incident, you have no clue if what he says is 
true."34 Another prosecutor revealed that "the biggest surprise 
is the amount of time you spend with criminals. You spend 
most of your time with cooperators. It's bizarre."35 Another 
prosecutor describes the phenomenon of "falling in love with 
your rat"36: 
You are not supposed to, of course. . .. But you spend time 
with this guy, you get to know him and his family. You like 
him. . .. [T]he reality is that the cooperator's information 
often becomes your mind set .... It's a phenomenon and the 
danger is that because you feel all warm and fuzzy about 
your cooperator, you come to believe that you do not have to 
28Id. 
29 Natapoff, supra note 5 (describing the contours of the informant institution). 
30 Weinstein, supra note 27, at 563 ("These are boom times for sellers and buyers 
of cooperation in the federal criminal justice system."). 
31 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS Table 5.34 (2001) (stating that thirty percent of federal drug defendants 
received on-the-record cooperation credit under USSG § 5K1.1); American College of 
Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5KI.1 of the 'United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2001) (citing sentencing commission 
report that "fewer than half of cooperating defendants receive a departure"). 
32 See Natapoff, supra note 5. 
33 See id. 
!l4 Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 937. 
35Id. at 937-38. 
36Id. at 944. 
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spend much time or energy investigating the case and you 
don't. Once you become chummy with your cooperator, there 
is a real danger that you lose your objectivity .... 37 
Because investigations and cases rely so heavily on 
informants, protecting and rewarding informants has become 
an important part of law enforcement.3S Police and prosecutors 
are well known for protecting their snitches: all too often, when 
defendants or courts seek the identity of informants, cases are 
dismissed or warrant applications are dropped. 39 More 
fundamentally, police and prosecutors become invested in their 
informants' stories, and therefore may lack the objectivity to 
know when their sources are lying.40 
Informants are thus punished for silence and rewarded for 
producing inculpatory information, even when that information 
is inaccurate. The system protects them from the consequences 
of their inaccuracies by guarding their identities and making 
their information the centerpiece of the government's cases. 
The front line officials who handle informants - police and 
prosecutors - are ill equipped to screen that information, and 
once they incorporate it into their cases, they acquire a stake in 
its validity. This phenomenon explains in part why snitch 
testimony generates so many wrongful convictions: it 
permeates the criminal system and there are few safeguards 
against it. 
III. LITIGATING SNITCHES: A DAUBERT-INSPIRED APPROACH 
While the impact of informants on the criminal system 
goes far beyond their role as witnesses, an important part of 
the wrongful conviction phenomenon turns on the role of 
snitches at trial. Many wrongful convictions represent 
instances where an innocent defendant refuses to plead guilty 
and goes to trial, but is nonetheless convicted because the jury 
accepts a snitch's testimony as credible and true. When this 
happens, the integrity of the system is at stake. This section 
37Id. 
38 See Natapoff, supra note 5, at 654-57, 671-74 (documenting the nature and 
extent of law enforcement reliance on informants). 
39 See,. e.g. , L. Paul Sutton, Getting Around the Fourth Amendment, in THINKING 
ABOUT POLICE 441, 443 (Carl B. Klockars & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 2d ed. 1991). 
40 Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 943-44. 
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proposes a limited remedy for this problem in the form of pre-
trial reliability hearings. Illinois has adopted this procedure 
for in-custody informants (so-called "jailhouse snitches"), and 
at least two U.S. jurisdictions as well as Canada have 
contemplated variations of it.41 
The theory behind pre-trial reliability hearings mirrors the 
reasoning in Daubert v. Merrell Dow,42 in which the Supreme 
Court established the necessity for reliability hearings for 
expert witnesses. As Professor George Harris points out, there 
are many similarities between snitches and expert witnesses.43 
Like experts, informants are "paid" by one party.44 This makes 
them more one-sided than typical witnesses.45 Informants' 
testimony is coached and prepared by government lawyers, 
making them challenging to cross-examine.46 Moreover, 
informants' stories are hard to corroborate or contradict in 
cases where their testimony is the central evidence against the 
defendant. 47 Finally, like experts, informants may have an air 
of "inside knowledge" about the crime that may sway the jury, 
an air that is not easily dispelled by cautionary instructions.48 
Indeed, the prevalence of wrongful convictions based on snitch 
testimony demonstrates that juries often believe informants.49 
For these types of reasons, the Supreme Court has 
recognized . that discovery, cross-examination and jury 
instructions - the traditional adversarial protections against 
false testimony - do not guarantee a rigorous jury evaluation of 
expert testimony. 50 The court must act as a preliminary "gate-
41 See ILL. COMPo STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21 (2003); Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 
785 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (Strubhar, J., specially concurring); D'Agostino v. State, 
823 P.2d 283, 285 (Nev. 1992) (holding that before "jailhouse incrimination" testimony 
is admissible the "trial judge [must) first determineD that the details of the admissions 
supply a sufficient indicia of reliability"); ILLINOIS COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 122 
(documenting Canadian experience). 
42 Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring courts to 
independently evaluate reliability of expert testimony). 
43 George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and 
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000). 
44Id. at 3. 
45Id. at 4. 
46Id. at 31. 
47Id. at 71. 
48 See Harris, supra note 43, at 49-58 (describing inadequate procedural controls 
over cooperating witnesses). 
49Id. at 57-58. 
50 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
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keeper" and evaluate the reliability of experts before the jury 
hears them.51 For these same reasons, courts should act as 
gatekeepers and evaluate the reliability of informants before 
they can testify at trial. This would permit fuller disclosure of 
the deals that informants make with the government,52 allow 
more thorough testing of the truthfulness of informants, and 
reduce opportunities for abuse. It would also acknowledge that 
even well-meaning police and prosecutors may need help in 
ascertaining the reliability of their criminal sources. 
Illinois has enacted a statute that provides a potential 
blueprint for the type of reliability inquiry that a trial court 
should conduct in evaluating informant testimony. 53 This 
statute places the burden on the government to prove 
reliability by a preponderance of the evidence, and requires the 
court to consider the following factors: 
(1) the complete criminal history of the informant; 
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the 
offering party has made or will make in the future to the 
informant; 
(3) the statements made by the accused; 
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place 
of their disclosure to law enforcement officials, and the 
names of all persons who were present when the statements 
were made; 
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that 
testimony or statement and, if so, the time and place of the 
recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names of 
the persons who were present at the recantation; 
(6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided 
that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained 
through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant 
received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for 
or subsequent to that testimony or statement; and 
(7) any other information relevant to the informant's 
credibility. 54 
51Id. 
52 See Justin Scheck, Circuit Gets Tough on Secret Deals, THE RECORDER, Feb. 
16, 2006 (describing increasing attention to secret deals between prosecutors and 
informants that are not revealed to defense or the court). 
53 ILL. COMPo STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115·21(c) (2003). 
54Id. 
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In effect, this model permits the court to examine the 
informant's incentives to lie, his history of escaping 
punishment through snitching, the existence, or lack, of 
corroboration, and the government's efforts to check the 
informant's story. 55 Such reliability determinations will be 
more efficient and effective in avoiding wrongful convictions 
because the court can evaluate the informant in the same way 
that it evaluates all preliminary questions of admissibility, 
without the constraints of the rules of evidence or the presence 
of the jury.56 
Although Illinois limits reliability hearings to in-custody 
informants, all informant testimony in which a criminal 
witness receives compensation for inculpating someone else is 
potentially infected by the same unreliability. 57 Accordingly, 
reliability hearings should be available in any case, pre-plea as 
well as pre-trial, in which a compensated informant is the 
source of inculpatory evidence.58 Given the prevalence of 
informant falsehoods in wrongful capital convictions, such 
hearings should be mandatory in capital cases, even where the 
defense intends to concede guilt and move directly to the 
sentencing phase. If the government's information is based on 
informant testimony, the defense in turn will rely on such 
testimony in assessing the likelihood of success at trial. Given 
the stakes, such evaluations should not be left to the vagaries 
of informant truthfulness. 
The Appendix to this Comment contains a motion and 
memorandum of law in support of the motion, requesting a 
reliability hearing in a capital case in which the main evidence 
against the defendant was supplied by three informant-
accomplices. While the factual scenario is not universal, the 
legal analysis could form a basis for similar requests. 
55 See id. 
56 FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
57 Harris, supra note 43, at 63. 
58 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629·633 (2002) (holding that the 
government is not constitutionally obligated to provide impeachment information to 
defendants pleading guilty). 
9
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N. APPENDIX: MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PRE-TRIAL SNITCH RELIABILITY HEARING59 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
* 






* * * * * * * * * 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE COOPERATING WITNESS 
TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR A RELIABILITY 
HEARING 
John Doe, by and through his attorneys, respectfully 
moves, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 104, 403, and 
701, to exclude the testimony of cooperating witnesses John 
Smith, John Jones and John Johnson, because their testimony 
is unreliable and its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Mr. Doe further 
requests that the Court hold a pre-trial hearing to determine 
the reliability of these witnesses. In support of this motion Mr. 
Doe alleges as follows: 
1. Mr. Doe has been charged by indictment with use of a 
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence that results 
in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924G), carjacking in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, conspiracy in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and related counts. 
59 This motion is available for download at 
http://www.lls.edulacademics/faculty/natapoff·snitching.html. Although this motion 
was filed in federal district court and is thus a matter of public record, I have changed 
the names and other identifying information. The motion was never ruled on. 
10
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2. In addition to Mr. Doe, three other men were arrested 
in connection with this case. Those men are John Smith, John 
Jones, and John Johnson. Information provided by the 
government indicates that, shortly after their arrests, these 
three men gave statements to the police. Eventually each man 
exonerated himself and implicated Mr. Doe in the victim's 
murder. The men also portrayed Mr. Doe as the leader in the 
carjacking. All three are now cooperating with the government 
against Mr. Doe. 
3. In exchange for having incriminated Mr. Doe, the 
cooperators have all received compensation from the 
government in the form of charging and sentencing 
consideration. In particular, as a result of their statements 
implicating Mr. Doe, they have been permitted to plead guilty 
in state court to parole able sentences of forty-five years for 
Smith and Jones, and thirty-five years for Johnson. Family 
members of the men have advised counsel that if Mr. Doe is 
convicted, their sentences may be further reduced. In light of 
the compensation that the cooperating witnesses have received 
(and may expect to receive) in exchange for implicating Mr. 
Doe, their testimony is biased and inherently unreliable. 
4. Their testimony also will be extremely difficult to 
disprove because they are the only witnesses to the crime, and 
the police have recovered very little physical evidence. Cross-
examination may be an insufficient tool to establish the 
veracity of these unverifiable statements. 
5. For these reasons, Mr. Doe moves to exclude the 
testimony of the three cooperating witnesses based on its 
unreliability, its lack of probative value, its prejudicial nature, 
and its imperviousness to cross-examination at trial. 
6. Several courts have held that pre-trial reliability 
hearings are appropriate where unreliable cooperating 
witnesses are propounded as witnesses. The Illinois Governor's 
Commission on Capital Punishment recently has recommended 
that reliability hearings be held whenever an in-custody 
informant is a potential witness in a capital case. In this case, 
a hearing is especially important, because the government's 
entire case for guilt and for the death penalty rests on 
cooperating informant testimony. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Doe requests that the Court hold a 
pre-trial reliability hearing at which the cooperators shall be 
made available for examination by counsel, to permit the Court 
11
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to decide whether their testimony is sufficiently reliable, and 
therefore sufficiently probative, to be admissible under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403. A separate memorandum of law is 
submitted in support of this motion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
12
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
* 






* * * * * * * * * 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE COOPERATING WITNESS 




"It is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than 
the inducement of a reduced sentence . . .." United States v. 
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987). In this 
case, the government's case for Mr. Doe's guilt, and potentially 
for the death penalty, will be based primarily on the testimony 
of three compensated, interested, biased witnesses whose 
eventual freedom depends on their ability to obtain Mr. Doe's 
conviction. Under the circumstances, their reliability is so 
compromised that their testimony lacks probative value, 
thereby failing the test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have called for increased judicial 
scrutiny of compensated informant witnesses, and several 
courts have mandated pre-trial reliability hearings to permit 
courts to evaluate the reliability of compensated witnesses such 
as the cooperators in this case. Mr. Doe thus requests that the 
Court hold a reliability hearing to require the government to 
establish the reliability of its cooperating witnesses, to exclude 
some or all of those witnesses if the Court deems it 
appropriate, and to preserve Mr. Doe's right to a fair trial. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
* * * 
13
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ARGUMENT 
I. COURTS HAVE DEEMED COMPENSATED WITNESSES 
UNRELIABLE AND SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL 
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
The Fourth Circuit has recently expressed its deep concern 
over the use of compensated informant testimony and its 
reluctance to admit such testimony absent stringent judicial 
controls. United States v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454, 459-62 (4th 
Cir. 2002). Compensated testimony "create[s] fertile fields 
from which truth-bending or even perjury could grow, 
threatening the core of a trial's legitimacy." Id. at 462. Such 
testimony "may be approved only rarely and under the highest 
scrutiny." Id. 60 
The Fourth Circuit has prescribed additional procedural 
guarantees that the government must adhere to where the use 
of compensated informant witnesses is contemplated. Before 
such testimony will be permitted: (1) the compensation 
arrangement must be disclosed to the defendant, (2) the 
defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness, and (3) the jury must be instructed to engage in 
heightened scrutiny of the witness. Finally, where the 
compensation is: 
contingent on the content or nature of the testimony given, 
the court must ascertain (1) that the government has 
independent means, such as corroborating evidence, by 
which to measure the truthfulness of the witness's testimony 
and (2) that the contingency is expressly linked to the 
witness testifying truthfully. Moreover, when a witness is 
testifying under such a contingent payment arrangement, 
the government has a duty to inform the court and opposing 
counsel when the witness' testimony is inconsistent with the 
government's expectation. 
Levenite, 277 F.3d at 462-63. 
60 Although Levenite concerned a witness who was testifying in exchange for 
money, the same concerns arise when the compensation consists of reduced criminal 
sanctions. Indeed, the promise of a reduced sentence or the elimination of the capital 
sentencing option may be far more valuable to a defendant than cash. See Cervantes-
Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 (the same analysis is applied by analogy when lenience is 
provided as compensation for information). 
14
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Similarly the Ninth Circuit has called for increased 
judicial scrutiny of deals between informants and the 
government, holding that "where the prosecution fails to 
disclose evidence such as the existence of a leniency deal or 
promise that would be valuable in impeaching a witness whose 
testimony is central to the prosecution's case, it violates the 
due process rights of the accused and undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial," Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 581 
(9th Cir. 2005), and calling such lack of disclosure 
"unscrupulous." Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
In this case, the three cooperators are being compensated 
specifically for testimony adverse to Mr. Doe. They have 
already received the benefit of reduced charges and have been 
promised low, agreed-upon sentences, and may have their 
sentences further reduced if Mr. Doe is convicted. Their 
testimony is thus compensated, contingent testimony precisely 
of the sort that so troubled the Fourth Circuit in Levenite. The 
Court therefore has an obligation to ascertain whether the 
government can corroborate the cooperators' truthfulness, the 
nature of the contingency arrangement, and the means the 
government intends to use to assure that the cooperators 
testify truthfully. Because of the difficulty ascertaining these 
matters in the heat of trial in the presence of the jury, a pre-
trial reliability hearing is warranted. 
II. COMPENSATED WITNESSES ARE INHERENTLY 
UNRELIABLE 
A growing body of literature documents the inherent 
unreliability of compensated witnesses, cooperating co-
conspirators, "jailhouse snitches," and other types of 
informants. Numerous horror stories of wrongful convictions 
based on perjurious informant testimony have emerged, and 
they have prompted official review of the practice of permitting 
compensated informant testimony. The following list contains 
just a few of the efforts to document and control informant 
unreliability: 
1. The founders of the Innocence Project discovered that 
twenty-one percent of the innocent defendants on death row 
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were placed there by false informant testimony.61 
2. The Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital 
Punishment unanimously concluded that "[t]estimony from 
in-custody witnesses has often been shown to have been 
false, and several of the thirteen cases of men released from 
death row involved, at least in part, testimony from an in-
custody informant."62 The Commission recommended the 
holding of reliability hearings to mitigate the chances of 
perjury. 
3. In their comprehensive historical study, Bedau and 
Radelet discovered that one-third of the 350 erroneous 
convictions they studied were due to "perjury by prosecution 
witnesses." This was twice as many as the next leading 
source - erroneous eyewitness identification - and stemmed 
in large part from the prevalence of co-conspirator 
testimony.63 
Courts likewise have recognized the inherent unreliability 
of compensated informants, going so far as to take judicial 
notice of their tendency to lie. "The use of informants to 
investigate and prosecute persons engaged in clandestine 
criminal activity is fraught with peril. This hazard is a matter 
'capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot· reasonably be questioned' and 
thus of which we can take judicial notice." United States v. 
Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). "Our judicial 
history is speckled with cases where informants falsely pointed 
the finger of guilt at suspects and defendants, creating the risk 
of sending innocent persons to prison." Id. Another court has 
noted that "[n]ever has it been more true that a criminal 
charged with a serious crime understands that a fast and easy 
way out of trouble with the law is ... to cut a deal at someone 
else's expense and to purchase leniency from the government 
by offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for 
reduced incarceration." Commonwealth of Northern Mariana 
Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, 
long before snitching became a pervasive aspect of the criminal 
61 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 126·57 
(Doubleday 2000). 
62 ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Chapter 8 (April 
2002). 
63 Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital 
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 173 (1987). 
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justice system, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he use of 
informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the 
other betrayals which are 'dirty business' may raise serious 
questions of credibility." On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 
755 (1952). 
Where the unreliability of a particular type of witness is so 
well-established, it is appropriate for the court to take 
protective steps to guarantee the integrity of the process. Cf 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595 
(1993) (court to act as "gatekeeper" to ensure reliability of 
scientific evidence). 
III. CROSS EXAMINATION IS AN INSUFFICIENT 
GUARANTEE OF RELIABILITY IN THIS CASE 
Despite the recognized unreliability of compensated 
informant witnesses, courts have traditionally permitted them 
to testify on the assumption that cross-examination will 
adequately test an informant's truthfulness. See, e.g., Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966). In Hoffa, the Supreme 
Court upheld the use of a compensated informant, holding that 
his testimony did not violate the defendant's right to due 
process, in large part because of the availability of cross-
examination, reasoning that "[t]he established safeguards of 
the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a 
witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of 
his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury." 
Id. at 311; see also Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 
(procedural protections of discovery, cross-examination, and 
jury instructions regarding informants satisfy due process). 
The cooperators' testimony in this case, however, will be 
nearly impossible for defense counsel to penetrate on cross-
examination. The cooperators are the only witnesses to the 
crime, and their stories can be neither independently confirmed 
nor disproved. The assertion that Mr. Doe was the shooter-the 
most important single disputed fact in the entire case-rests 
entirely upon the self-serving, unverifiable statements of the 
cooperating witnesses. Their mere ipse dixit, if maintained, 
could suffice to persuade a jury to impose the death penalty on 
Mr. Doe. 
Cross-examination will be further hampered because the 
defense lacks pre-trial access to the cooperators. At this stage 
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in the proceedings, the defense has not yet seen the 
cooperators' plea agreements. The cooperators, on the other 
hand, have had multiple opportunities to hone their version of 
events in preparation for court, both in the state proceedings 
and in connection with this federal case. This combination of 
one-sided access and government preparation will render these 
witnesses overly prepared and difficult to examine at trial. 
Finally, unlike uncharged lay witnesses, the cooperators 
have compelling incentives to pin responsibility on Mr. Doe. 
Their future literally hangs in the balance, based on their 
ability to maintain a consistent story. For all these reasons, in-
trial cross-examination may be insufficient to determine 
whether the cooperators are being truthful. 
Professor George Harris has analyzed the difficulty of 
cross-examining informants whose compensation depends on 
their usefulness to the prosecutor. As Professor Harris 
explains: 
Paradoxically, the more a witness's fate depends on the 
success of the prosecution, the more resistant the witness 
will be to cross-examination. A witness whose future 
depends on currying the government's favor will formulate a 
consistent and credible story calculated to procure an 
agreement with the government and will adhere religiously 
at trial to her prior statements.64 
In this case, the motivations of the cooperators are 
precisely those described by Professor Harris. Years of their 
lives literally depend on the success of this prosecution, and 
therefore they will be more resistant to cross-examination than 
the typical witness. 
For these reasons, the Court should not rely on defense 
counsel's eventual cross-examination of these witnesses to 
establish their truthfulness, but rather should have the 
opportunity, unfettered by the rules of evidence and the 
presence of the jury, to determine for itself whether the 
testimony of these witnesses bears sufficient indicia of 
reliability to permit its presentation at trial. 
64 George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and 
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 54 (2000) (attached as Ex. D). 
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO 
ESTABLISH THE RELIABILITY OF ITS COOPERATING 
WITNESSES 
The government has special obligations when it comes to 
their cooperating informants. Courts have established that a 
"prosecutor who does not appreciate the perils of using 
rewarded criminals as witnesses risks compromising the truth-
seeking mission of our criminal justice system [and courts] 
expect prosecutors and investigators to take all reasonable 
measures to safeguard the system against treachery." 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands u. Bowie, 236 
F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Leuenite, 277 F.3d at 
459-62. This obligation stems from two sources: first, the 
government enlists and controls and rewards its informants 
and is therefore in a unique position to evaluate their 
reliability. The second is that the prosecutor, as the 
representative of the sovereign, has an ethical obligation to 
ensure that the defendant is given a fair trial. See Bowie, 236 
F.3d at 1089 (citing Berger u. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935». 
Unfortunately, because of the dynamics of this case, the 
government is in a weak position to guarantee the reliability of 
the cooperators' testimony. From the inception of this case, the 
cooperators have been well aware that any hope of lenience 
rested on their ability to provide the government with useful 
information. The government is thus the primary target of the 
cooperators' efforts to escape punishment, and if the 
cooperators are lying, they will presumably be particularly 
careful not to reveal it to the government. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed these issues of reliability and 
government obligations in a case with facts startlingly similar 
to the instant case. In Bowie, three co-conspirators were 
charged with murder and kidnapping. There was some 
evidence that two of the three conspired to pin the murder on 
the third. The government's failure to fully investigate the 
possibility of collaborative perjury caused the Court to reverse 
the conviction. In its decision, the Court noted that when the 
government makes a deal with an informant, "each contract for 
testimony is fraught with the real peril that the proffered 
testimony will not be truthful, but simply factually contrived to 
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'get' a target of sufficient interest to induce concessions from 
the government." Bowie, 236 F.3d at 1095. The Court 
concluded that "rewarded criminals represent a great threat to 
the mission of the criminal justice system." Id. 
Barry Tarlow has likewise documented the significant 
difficulties that prosecutors experience in holding their 
criminal informants accountable.65 Tarlow, a former 
prosecutor, explains how prosecutors may be drawn in by 
informants who have strong motivations to pin responsibility 
on others, and notes the heavy pressures on prosecutors to rely 
on unreliable compensated witnesses when others are 
unavailable. 
Given the inherent "peril" of rewarded testimony and the 
government's heavy reliance on it in this case, the government 
should not be permitted merely to proffer its good faith belief in 
the reliability of its witnesses. Rather, it is appropriate to hold 
a hearing to establish the reliability of the witnesses through 
adversarial questioning and a neutral evaluation by the Court. 
V. A PRETRIAL RELIABILITY HEARING IS REQUIRED TO 
TEST THE INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY OUTSIDE THE 
PRESENCE OF THE JURY 
A. The Court has the Authority and Obligation to 
Conduct a Reliability Hearing Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence 
In this case, the interests of justice and a fair trial require 
a pretrial reliability hearing to permit the Court to ascertain 
the reliability and probative value of the cooperators' 
testimony. The Court has clear authority to hold such a 
hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(c), which 
provides: "Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in 
all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings 
on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the 
interests of justice require .... " 
The rules of evidence likewise obligate the Court to screen 
out unfairly prejudicial, harmful, confusing or otherwise 
unhelpful evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides 
65 See Barry Tarlow, Perjuring Informants Brought to the Bar, RICO Report, 
CHAMPION, at 33-40 (July 2000). 
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that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." Likewise, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 701, limits lay witness testimony to testimony that 
is "helpful" to the trier of fact. 
At least two courts and one state legislature have 
mandated reliability hearings whenever incarcerated 
informants ("jailhouse snitches") are proposed witnesses. See 
Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Ok. Ct. of Crim. App. Jan. 6, 
2000) (Strubhar, J., concurring) (approving lower court 
imposition of "reliability hearing" comparable to Daubert 
hearing); D'Agostino v. State, 107 Nev. 1001, 823 P.2d 283 
(Nev. 1992) (holding that before "jailhouse incrimination" 
testimony is admissible the "trial judge [must] first determineD 
that the details of the admissions supply a sufficient indicia of 
reliability"). Illinois mandates such hearings by law. See ILL. 
COMPo STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21(c) (2003). Illinois's statutory 
requirement is based on the recommendations of the 
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, which 
concluded that reliability hearings are necessary whenever 
incarcerated informants are offered as witnesses.66 Such 
conclusions apply here with equal force. Jailhouse snitches are 
incarcerated defendants who provide information to law 
enforcement in exchange for charging and sentencing benefits. 
The ability of such snitches to fabricate confessions and other 
evidence has become infamous.67 Precisely the same concerns 
are present where, as here, the informant is in custody, subject 
to criminal penalties, and is offering unique, unverifiable 
information in exchange for lenience. 
B. The Principles of Daubert Support the Holding of a 
Reliability Hearing 
The law's treatment of expert witnesses further supports 
the holding of a reliability hearing in this instance. In Daubert 
V. Merrell Dow Pharmceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the 
66 See ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at 30, 122. 
67 See id. at 122·123 (detailing the Los Angeles Grand Jury investigation of 
jailhouse snitch testimony). 
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Supreme Court determined the need for a special mechanism 
to evaluate the reliability of expert witnesses because experts 
pose thorny problems of cross-examination and persuasion. 
Experts, for example, rely on specialized information that is 
not directly available to the jury. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
The court held that the concerns underlying Rule 403 are 
preeminent because expert witnesses can have such a potent 
effect on juries: 
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading 
because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this 
risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against 
probative force under Rule 403 0 exercises more control over 
experts than over lay witnesses. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Moreover, as Professor Harris 
has noted, expert witnesses are compensated, violating the 
usual presumption against the use of paid testimony.68 The 
suitability of compensated expert testimony is thus determined 
in part by pre-trial judicial examinations of reliability. 
Informants pose many of the same special concerns that 
expert witnesses do. Unlike typical lay witnesses, they are 
compensated, they have personal interests in the outcome of 
the case, their testimony is difficult to test on cross-
examination, and they are selected and controlled by the 
propounding party.69 Like experts, moreover, informant 
testimony can be "powerful and quite misleading." Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 595. At least one court has expressly extended the 
principles of Daubert to cover informants, imposing a 
"reliability hearing" requirement whenever the testimony of a 
so-called "jailhouse snitch" is involved. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 
778, 784 (Ok. Ct. of Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2000) (Strubhar, J., 
concurring) (approving lower court imposition of "reliability 
hearing" comparable to Daubert hearing). 
In this case, the cooperators are the sole witnesses to the 
crime and their version of the story will carry heavy weight 
with the jury. In the same way that courts act as "gatekeepers" 
with respect to experts, it is appropriate for this Court to 
ensure that unreliable informant testimony does not taint the 
68 See Harris, supra note 64, at 1-5. 
69 See id. at 49-59. 
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jury. 
C. A Reliability Hearing is Warranted on the Facts of 
this Case 
In this case,· the cooperators' testimony presents a 
substantial danger of "unfair prejudice" because it is the 
government's primary evidence against Mr. Doe, because it is 
highly unreliable, because the cooperators have overwhelming 
motivations to lie, and because their testimony cannot be 
disproved. Their testimony may not be helpful to the trier of 
fact if it is so biased and unverifiable that no trier of fact can 
conclusively determine it is truthful or not. 
It is particularly important that the cooperators' reliability 
be tested prior to trial outside the presence of the jury. The 
cooperators' reliability, their incentives to fabricate, the details 
of the crime, and their relationship to the defendant are 
matters which may only be susceptible to penetration through 
the more informal inquiries permitted under Rule 104, where 
the rules of evidence do not apply. Moreover, the Court is 
better suited to recognize reliability and credibility concerns 
that may elude the jury. The inquiry into such matters also 
could be highly prejudicial if heard by a jury and incurable by 
subsequent jury instruction. 
Finally, as noted above, the procedural requirements set 
forth in Leuenite can best be met at a preliminary hearing. At 
such a hearing, the informant will be subject to cross-
examination, and the government can provide to the Court and 
counsel any corroboration it might have and provide 
assurances that the arrangement with the witnesses indeed 
protects against perjurious testimony. 
For all these reasons, Mr. Doe moves to exclude the 
testimony of the cooperators, and for a pretrial reliability 
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